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ARGUMENT
I
AT ALL TIMES SUBSEQUENT TO THE MARCH 12, 1986
LETTER AGREEMENT, A BINDING CONTRACT EXISTED BETWEEN
REPUBLIC AND THE SHAREHOLDERS OF WON-DOOR.

The central issue in this case is raised by defendants1
arguments that the March 12, 1986 letter agreement some how expired
or became void because the letter agreement only provided for or
applied to a sale of 22 percent of the stock of Won-Door and that
the letter agreement was not modified and therefore that no
contract or agreement existed between Republic and the shareholders
of Won-Door until the August 22, 1986 agreement.
This argument entirely

ignores the undisputed

facts, as

clearly established in the detailed and un-rebutted affidavits of
Irvin Bird, Mark McSwain

and Bryant Cragun1, that when the

principles of Republic met with Watkins shortly after receiving the
March 12, 1986 letter agreement and explained to Watkins that
Republic was having difficulty in finding a buyer for a minority
interest in a closely held family corporation but had found
considerable interest from buyers in acquiring all or at least a
controlling interest in Won-Door, Watkins immediately agreed that

1

Record at pp. 180-88 and pp.474-486. It should be noted
that Watkins filed a responsive affidavit after Bird's, McSwain's
and Cragun's affidavits were filed and that Watkins did not
controvert, in any material way, any of allegations contained in
these affidavits.
1

Republic, as the finder for the shareholders of Won-Door under the
March 12, 1986 agreement, should seek out buyers for all of the
stock of Won-Door.
Inasmuch as it was obvious that a fee greater than the
$250,000 for the sale of 22% of the stock of Won-Door, as agreed in
March 12, 1986 letter, should be paid to Republic if it was
successful in finding a buyer for all of the stock of Won-Door at
a proportionably higher price, Bird and the other principles asked
Watkins what fee Republic would be paid if Republic found a buyer
for all of the stock of Won-Door. Watkins responded that he would
have to think about it, but in any event would pay Republic a fair
or reasonable fee and that, due to his long standing relationship
as a friend and former attorney for Irvin Bird, he should be
trusted to see that Republic was paid a fair fee in line with his
prior agreements.
At that point (March or early April of 1986) it is clear that
Watkins agreed to amend or broaden the scope of the March 12, 1986
agreement and pay to Republic a fee in the event Republic found a
buyer for all of the stock of Won-Door.

It is also clear that

Watkins agreed to pay a fair or reasonable fee impliedly greater
than the $250,000 fee that Republic was to receive if it found a
buyer for only 22% of the stock of Won-Door.
Further as a matter of common sense Defendants1 argument that
the March 12, 1986 agreement to pay Republic a fee $250,000 for
finding a buyer for 22% of the stock of Won-Door
2

imposed no

contractual obligation on the shareholders of Won-Door to pay
Republic at least $250,000 in the event Republic eventually found
an buyer acceptable to the shareholders who purchased more than 22%
of does not make sense.
Stated in terms of more common experience, this argument is
tantamount to arguing that a real estate broker who finds an
acceptable buyer who eventually purchases all of your 100 acres is
not entitled to a fee as a result of the sale because the listing
agreement only covers 22 acres notwithstanding the fact that the
seller, after listing the seven acres, encouraged the broker to
find a buyer for of all of property and agreed to a pay a fair fee
impliedly in line with the increased revenue realized if the broker
was successful in selling the additional acres.
It is also undisputed that Republic relying on this agreement
and at Watkins1 continual encouragement sought out and contacted
some twenty to thirty companies for the purpose of selling all of
the stock of Won-Door prior to the time Watkins entered into the
exclusive finders agreement with Boettcher in late April 28 without
notice to Republic.
It is also undisputed that one of the companies contacted by
Republic pursuant to Watkins1 agreement that Republic find a buyer
for all of Won-Doors stock was Thermal System's Inc. (TSI) who in

3

October of 1986 purchased all of the Defendant's stock in Won-Door
for some $39,000,000.2
It should be noted that the sale of all of the stock to TSI
is entirely consistent with the objective set forth in the Letter
agreement of March 12, 1986 between Watkins and Republic wherein
Watkins is states that the objective of the shareholder in selling
stock in Won-Door to further their goal to "become a public company
within five year period". As a result of the TSI acquisition of
Won-Door, Won-Door became a wholly owned subsidiary of a public
company and with the former shareholders of Won-Door now holding
stock in the public company.
The foregoing undisputed facts establish as a matter of law
that at the time Watkins entered into the Boettcher agreement and
at the time he negotiated the August 22, 1986 with Republic there
was,

in fact,

a binding enforceable agreement whereby the

shareholders of Won-Door where clearly obligated to pay to Republic
a reasonable fee exceeding $250,000 in the event one of Republic's
contacts purchased the stock of Won-Door.

2

Defendants' unsupported statement that the sale of Won-Door
was pursuant to an installment sale agreement and that TSI
defaulted in it's payments to the shareholders of Won-Door is
simply untrue. The closing documents of the sale, the public
records of the Security and Exchange Commission and the records of
United States Bankruptcy Court for Utah in the TSI bankruptcy
action clearly show that on October 26, 1986 the shareholders of
Won-Door received $15,000,000 in cash and shares in TSI with a
market value on that day of $24,750,000.00 and that Boettcher
received a fee of $2 57,000.00.
4

Although Republic does not dispute that Watkins was free to
enter into the subsequent contract with Boettcher, such contract in
no way operated to limit Republic's claim to a reasonable fee to
the "ten exclusions" in the Boettcher agreement in the event one of
it's contacts purchased all of the stock of Won-Door under it's
prior agreements with Watkins absent an clear agreement by Republic
to be bound by Watkins' subsequent agreement with Boettcher.
It is undisputed that prior to August 22, 1986 Republic did
not agree to be bound by the terms of the Boettcher agreement and
affirmatively informed Watkins that Republic did not feel it was
bound to limit it's claim to a fee under it's prior agreements with
Watkins to a list of 10 qualified companies if a contact of
Republics purchased the stock in Won-Door which was not on "the
list of 10 qualified companies".
In this regard, Republic submits that Watkins' recognized (i)
that he had agreed to pay Republic a reasonable fee in the event
one of Republic's contacts brought all of Won-Door's stock; and
(ii) that under the term's of his subsequent

agreement with

Boettcher, Watkins also recognized that the shareholders of WonDoor

or

Watkins

himself3

may

well

3

be

obligated

to

pay

a

It is undisputed that as a result of the TSI acquisition of
Won-Door, Watkins and members of his family received cash and stock
exceeding $1.8 million dollars and immediately upon the acquisition
Watkins became chief financial officer of TSP and eventually became
chief executive officer of TSP at substantial salaries. Watkins may
well have been a principle in the transaction as well as agent for
the shareholders.
5

substantial finders fee to both Republic and Boettcher in event
that a contact brought to him by Republic, but not excluded under
his agreement with Boettcher, purchased all of the stock of WonDoor.
It was recognition that two fees may have to be paid that
motivated Watkins to induce Republic to enter into the August 22,
1986 agreement —

not that Watkins merely wanted to settled a

dispute over a obligation that Defendants now urge clearly did not
exist at the time of the August 22, 1986 agreement.
Although successful in inducing Republic to enter into the
August 22, 1986 agreement, Watkins clearly induced Republic to
enter into the August 22, 1986 by misrepresention.

II
THE AUGUST 22, 1986 AGREEMENT IS NOT ENFORCEABLE
AND IS NOT CONTROLLING AS TO REPUBLIC'S CLAIM FOR IT'S
FEE.
On Friday evening August 22, 1986, Watkins came to Republic's
offices ostensibly for the purposes of entering in to written
agreement clearly defining what fee Republic would receive in the
event Leucadia, one of Republic's contacts, purchased all of the
stock of Won-Door in that Leucadia had informed Watkins that it
intended to make a firm offer for all of the stock of the following
Monday.

6

As established in the detailed and un-rebutted affidavits of
Irvin Bird and Mark McSwain, a heated discussion ensued which
continued over a period of several hours.
The source of the dispute was that Bird and McSwain were
unwilling to enter into the agreement (hand drafted by Watkins at
the meeting) because the agreement provided that Republic would
only get a fee exceeding $5000 if either Leucadia or one

of "ten

listed qualified companies" purchased the stock of Won-Door. Bird
and McSwain informed Watkins that Republic had, with Watkins1
express agreement and encouragment, contacted approximately thirty
companies and, although Republic wanted to cooperate with Watkins
in his dealings with Boettcher, felt they were under no obligation
to limit Republic's fee to "ten contacts" at least without out
knowing who the identity of companies with which Watkins had been
dealing.
Bird and McSwain informed Watkins that it was Republic's
positon that under it's prior agreements with Watkins it was
entitled to a fee if any of it's contacts purchased the stock of
Won-Door regardless of the undisclosed term of Watkins' agreement
with Boettcher.4
4

Paragraph 6 of the Boettcher Agreement specifically
required that the list of "ten exclusions" be submitted to
Boettcher not later than May 7, 1986. Contrary to Defendant's
statement in their Brief no where in the record is it shown that
any list of any exclusions was ever submitted to Boettcher by
Watkins or by any one else at Won-Door.
However, counsel for Defendants are fully aware that
Boettcher, in response to Republic's subpoena duce tecum has
7

In response, Watkins misrepresented to Bird and McSwain that
he was only dealing with two companies - Leucadia and one other and
the other company is not one of your companies .
Inasmuch as Bird and McSwain had agreed upon the Lehman
Formula would be an acceptable fee in the event Leucadia purchased
all

of

stock

of

Won-Door

and

because

Watkins

had

falsely

represented that the other company that he was dealing with was not
one of Republic's companies and therefore Republic would not be
entitled to a fee if the other company bought the stock of WonDoor, Bird and McSwain executed the August 22, 1986 agreement.
In fact, the other company who Watkins had been negotiating
since early July of 1986 was TSI and was clearly one of Republic's
produced copies of it's entire file on the matter and that no where
in the Boettcher files was any list of exclusions as alleged in
Defendants' Brief. There is in Boettcher's file a detailed list of
all of Boettcher's contacts which does not include TSI.
Defendants also rely on the fact that Boettcher received
it's fee as a result of the sale to TSI. It undisputed that under
the express terms of the Boettcher agreement Boettcher would be
entitled to a fee of at the time of sale of all of the stock of
Won-Door to TSI of some $489,000 if TSI where not listed as an
exclusion to the Boettcher agreement and a fee of $25,000 if TSI
was listed as an exclusion to the agreement. It is undisputed that
Boettcher received a total fee of $257,000 as result of TSI's
acquistion of Won-Door. This fee is exactly half the difference
between the two fees provided for in the contract.
Although
discovery was continuing, Republic suggests that evidence developed
before the case was dismissed clearly shows that Watkins never
supplied Boettcher with any list of exclusions as he represented to
Republic and that there is at least an inference that Boettcher
agreed to compromise it's fee by splitting the difference between
the two possible fees under its contract with Watkins because,
although TSI was not exclusion under the contract due to the fact
that no list of 10 exclusions was ever submitted to Boettcher by
Watkins, TSI was a company brought to Watkins by Republic before
Watkins' agreement with Boettcher.
8

contacts and was listed on Republic's list of May 27, 1986 that was
previously hand delivered to Watkins by Bird and was a contact
which Bird had previously discussed with Watkins in extensive
detail in an effort to dissuade him from entering into any deal
with TSI even though it was one of Republic's contacts.
Defendants suggestions that Watkins did not know that TSI was
the same company as Thermal Systems Inc; that Thermal System Inc.
did not buy the stock of Won-Door or that TSI does not appear on
any of Republic's lists because item 9 on the May 27, 1986 list of
companies hand delivered to Watkins by Bird lists Thermal Systems
Inc. as opposed to TSI or TS industries are entirely insupportable.
As stated above, Bird in a meeting at Watkins' office, in
early May of 1986 discussed in detail who TSI was, it's background,
who the principles were, the nature of it's business and presented
SEC filings on TSI to Watkins' clearly identifying TSP as Thermal
Systems Inc and TS Industries.
Further, at this time TSI had a large Salt Lake City plant
just few blocks from Watkins' office with a large sign on it's
building "Thermal Systems .Inc".

Given the level of Watkins'

familiarity with Thermal Systems Inc., Defendant's arguments are
the equivalent of claiming that a sophisticated and knowledgeable
businessman familiar with the computer industry had no idea that
IBM was the same company as International Business Machines.

9

Contrary to the Defendants1 unpersuasive argument "that it
strongly believes that Watkins did nothing wrong and that he did
not make any misrepresentation",5 Bird's and McSwain's un-rebutted
affidavits

clear

demonstrate

that

Watkins

affirmatively

misrepresented to Bird and McSwain that he was not dealing with any
of Republic's contacts other than Leucadia.
Such misrepresentation obviously was designed to and would
reasonably lead Bird and McSwain to believe that the provisions in
August 22,1986 agreement limiting Republic's fee to Leiucadia and
the "ten listed qualified companies" were irrelevant and that
therefore Republic could enter into the August 22, 1986 agreement,
as an accommodation to Watkins, with out effecting Republic's right
to receive a fee consistent with Watkins' prior agreements.
Obviously, it is this same provision regarding the "ten
exclusions" upon which Defendants subsequently based their entire
position that Republic was only entitled to a fee a $5000 as result
of the TSI acquisition of Won-Door for $39,000,000 - some $245,000
less than the fee Watkins intially agreed to pay Republic in the
event one of Republic's contact bought 22% of Won-Door's stock for
$7,392,000 under the terms of the March 12, 1986 agreement.

5

Defendants attempt to avoid liability for Watkins' actions
by claiming he has been discharged in bankruptcy. This argument
ignores the unquestioned fact that Watkins was at all times acting
as a fully authorized agent for the shareholders of Won-Door and
that his actions were binding upon them notwithstanding his
subsequent discharge in bankruptcy.
10

From any point of view this position can not be considered to
be consistent with the either Watkins1 or Republic!s reasonable
expectations under Watkins1 prior agreement to expand the March 12,
1986 agreement to provide that the shareholders of Won-Door would
pay Republic a reasonable or fair fee consistent with the March 12,
1986 agreement if one of it's contact purchase all of the stock of
Won-Door.
Republic readily admits that the law recognizes that there is
risk in every contract and courts will not intervene to remedy a
bad bargain or grant rights to parties to a contract for which they
did not otherwise bargain. However, basic contract law also does
not require parties bear the risk of a bad bargain which was
procured by a material misrepresentation or a even a material
mistake of fact so essential to the reasonable intent of the
contracting parties as to render the contract not to embody a true
meeting of the minds.
Further if the parties to the agreement are already in a
contractual relationship, as in this case, a duty of good faith and
fair dealing is imposed on both parties not knowingly to do
anything that would destroy or injure the other parties right to
receive the fruits of the contract and the parties actions must be
consistent with the common purpose and justified expectation of the
parties in light of the terms of the prior contract and the course
of the dealings between and the conduct of the parties. St.

11

Benedict's Development Co, v. St, Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194
(Utah 1991).
Under the undisputed facts of this case the August 22, 1986
agreement is as a matter of law unenforceable and should not
operate to limit Republic's fee to $5000 as a result of the sale of
all of the stock of Won-Door to TSI.
Likewise, Defendants' arguments that (i) the August 22, 1986
agreement constitutes an accord and satisfaction; (ii) that the
parties prior agreements are merged into the August 22, 1986; (ii),
that Watkins did not breach his duty of good faith and fair dealing
owed to Republic; or (iv) that Plaintiff has not presented facts
supporting a claim for fraud should be all be rejected,

III
REPUBLICS CLAIMS OF ESTOPPEL WERE FULLY PRESENTED TO
THE TRIAL COURT AND ARE REVIEWABLE ON APPEAL
Defendant argue that because the Republic's complaint did not
separately allege estoppel as a cause of action in it's complaint
the issue is not reviewable by this court.
The

argument that the

legal nature of the claim must

denominated and be set forth as a separate claim has simply not
been the law in Utah since introduction of the modern rules of
civil procedure embodying the concept of notice pleading.
The underlying purpose of notice pleading is to afford the
parties full opportunity to obtain the appropriate relief on any
12

claim reasonably embodied in the facts and the inferences that can
be reasonable drawn therefrom that are fairly presented to the
trial court.
In this case Republic admits that it's Complaint does not have
a separate cause of action denominated "promissory estoppel".
However, the facts plead in the complaint and the reasonable
inference that can be drawn therefrom form sufficient factual basis
to support the elements required for a claim for promissory
estoppel.
More importantly, Republic's claim of promissory estoppel was
clearly and fully presented and argued to the trial court and
Republic's claim of estoppel was certainly not presented to this
court for the first time as Defendant argues.
Beginning on page 29 of Republic's detailed Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support
of Plaintiff Motion for Partial Summary filed with the trial court
and served upon Defendants there appears the follow argument:
"III
DEFENDANTS BY THE CONDUCT OF THEIR OWN AGENT,
REED WATKINS, ARE ESTOPPED TO DENY, (i) THE VALIDITY OF THE
March 12, AGREEMENT, AND (ii) THAT A FEE BASED UPON A
REASONABLE APPLICATION OF THE March 12 Agreement IS DUE
REPUBLIC."
Republic's argument regarding estoppel continues for some
6 pages making substantially the same detailed arguments regarding

13

Republic's claims regarding estoppel to the trial court as are
found in Republic's Brief to this court.
It simply can not be argued that Republic's claims regarding
estoppel were not squarely before the trial court at the time the
trial court dismissed Republic claims.
Further, in Defendants' Reply to Republic's Memorandum in the
trial court and in oral argument to the trial court, Defendants,
while addressing the merits of the Republic's claims of estoppel,
at no time claimed surprise or that facts supporting a claim of
estoppel were not fairly embodied in Plaintiff's complaint or the
claim of estoppel was not in anyway properly before the trial
court.
The clear record in this case demonstrates that, in fact,
it is the Defendants, not the Plaintiffs, that are raising an issue
for the first time on appeal and Plaintiff submits that the
Defendants' completely insupportable arguments that estoppel was
not fairly before the trial court are merely an obvious attempt to
side step the merits of a well taken argument that was fully
presented to the trial court and is now properly before this court.

CONCLUSION
Although this case, upon initial examination, appears to be
a complicated case from both a factual and legal standpoint,
Plaintiff submits that upon a thorough review of the undisputed
facts that were established and presented to the trial court it
14

becomes abundantly clear that prior to August 22, 1986 that a
binding agreement between Watkins and Republic was reached which,
by

either

its

express

terms

or

by

estoppel,

obligated

the

shareholders of Won-Door to pay to Republic a reasonable fee as is
fairly implied under the terms of the March 12, 1986 agreement in
the event one of Republic's contacts purchased all of the stock.
Further, the August 22, 1986 agreement that Defendants claimed
as controlling when TSI acquired all of the stock of Won-Door was
procured by clear material misrepresentation by Watkins and was not
controlling as to the rights and obligations of the parties and
should have been rejected by the trial court.
Republic requests that this court reverse the trial court's
order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
trial court's implied denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and enter an order granting Plaintiff's motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and remanding the matter to the trial
court for further proceeding on Republic's claims of fraud.

Dated this / d a y of June 1993.
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